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CHAPTER 12 
Trusts and Estates 
EMIL SLIZEWSKI 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§12.1. Intestacy: Widow's share. If an intestate decedent leaves a 
widow, kindred, but no issue surviving him, present Massachusetts law 
provides that the widow is entitled to $25,000 and one-half of the re-
maining realty and personalty.l Although distribution of the estate 
may be postponed for a period of time, the widow's rights are vested at 
the death of her husband.2 Despite this, it appears in light of Brayton 
v. Stoughton 3 that her percentage share of all the assets subject to 
distribution may not be determined until there is a distribution or a 
decree of distribution. 
In this case the decedent died intestate in 1942 leaving an estate, con-
sisting entirely of personalty, in excess of $5,000. Under the statute 
then applicable the surviving spouse's share was $5,000 plus one-half 
of the balance. The widow, who was also the administratrix of the 
estate, failed to make any distribution during her lifetime other than 
to use a substantial part of the estate for her living expenses. Between 
1942 and 1954 the decedent's net estate substantially increased in value 
because of dividends and appreciation of securities. After the widow's 
death in 1954, an administrator de bonis non of her husband's estate 
brought a petition for distribution. The Probate Court adopted his 
plan under which the percentages to which the widow's estate and the 
heirs were respectively entitled were fixed as of the date of the death 
of the husband.4 This allotted more to the widow than would have 
been the case had the determination of the respective shares of the 
distributees taken place at the time of the filing of the petition for 
distribution. 
EMIL SUZEWSJU is Professor of Law at Boston College Law School and a mem-
ber of the Massachusetts Bar. 
§12.1. 1 G.L., c. 190, §§1, 2, as amended by Acts of 1956, c. 316. 
2 Spring v. Curry, 260 Mass. 556, 559, 157 N.E. 595, 596 (1927); Naylor v. Nourse, 
231 Mass. 341, 343, 121 N.E. 26, 27 (1918); Nesbit v. Cande, 206 Mass. 437, 439, 92 
N.R. 766 (1910) . 
• !l35 Mass. 321, 140 N.E.2d 161 (1957) . 
• If distribution had been made as of the date of the death of the husband, the 
widow would have been entitled to $5,000 and one half of $10,769.29. Her per-
centage share of the entire eatate subject to distribution would have been 73.2 
percent. 
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§12.2 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 75 
The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the decree, deciding that the 
critical date for the determination of the widow's share in her hus-
band's estate is the time of distribution. The applicable statute of 
descent and distribution limited the share of the surviving spouse to 
$5,000 and one half of the remaining property. Any increase in value of 
the decedent's property before distribution would have benefited the 
widow only to the extent of her one-half in excess of $5,000. /... 
The Court as an analogy relied on Sullings v. Richmond/" which 
held that a widow's forced share, which by statute was limited to 
$10,000, did not entitle her to any income or appreciation on that 
specific sum. The Probate Court was governed by the statute and 
could not order a payment of a sum greater than the statutory limit. 
The significant date for determination of the share was the date of 
distribution. Although Brayton v. Stoughton differs in that the widow 
was to receive a fraction of the estate above the designated sum of 
money, the cases are closely analogous in that both have to do with 
the question of whether the distributee is to be allowed any increase 
on the designated sum. No specific property is involved but a stated 
amount of money to be satisfied out of the assets of the probate estate. 
§12.2. Widow's allowance: Finality of decree. The amount that 
a court may allow a widow for necessaries pending the settlement of 
a deceased husband's estate is largely discretionary with the probate 
judge 1 and is subject to review by way of an appea1.2 It is doubtful, 
however, whether there is any other remedy available to next of kin 
dissatisfied with the allowance in view of a case decided during the 
1957 SURVEY year. 
In Vaughan v. Smith 3 it was held that the award to the widow for 
necessaries was not open to a collateral attack in a hearing upon the 
administratrix' account and that a petition to vacate the decree of 
allowance would not lie. The Court stated that "upon the allegations 
of the petition the Probate Court had jurisdiction to grant the allow-
ance and nothing was alleged which would give the court authority to 
revoke it." 4 No further mention was made of the contents of the 
petition. From the record,r; however, it appears that the petitioner, who 
was an heir-at-Iaw,6 alleged that the widow's allowance was decreed 
some two and one-half years before the petition to vacate was brought; 
that no notice of any proceedings in the estate was given to any of the 
heirs prior to a notice with reference to a hearing on the administra-
trix' first account two months before the petition; that the filing and 
Ii 13 Allen 277 (Mass. 1866). 
§12.2. 1 G.L., c. 196, §2; Newhall. Settlement of Estates §174 (3d ed. 1937). 
2 Hooker v. Porter, 273 Mass. 316. 173 N.E. 588 (1930); Glover v. Glover, 215 
Mass. 576. 102 N.E. 945 (1913); Chase v. Webster. 168 Mass. 228. 46 N.E. 705 (1897); 
Dale v. Hanover National Bank. 155 Mass. 141, 29 N.E. 371 (1891). 
3335 Mass. 418. 140 N.E.2d 195 (1957). 
4335 Mass. at 421. 140 N.E.2d at 197-198. 
II Record, pp. 49-53 . 
• The decedent left a widow and no issue; the petitioner was a (Ollateral heir. 
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the granting of the petition for a widow's allowance and the facts as 
to the circumstances did not come to the attention of the heirs until 
long after the appeal period had expired; that the widow's financial 
condition at the time of the decree for allowance did not justify the 
amount of the award; and that she did not adequately disclose the facts 
and circumstances with respect to her needs and financial position. 
The allegations indicate that a party who definitely had an interest 
in the proceedings did not have an opportunity to be heard on the 
question of the propriety of the amount of the award. His remedy was 
restricted to an appeal and he had no notice of the award to the widow 
and of the circumstances attending the decree of allowance until the 
appeal period had elapsed.7 Placing emphasis on the lack of an oppor-
tunity to be heard may suggest a possible violation of procedural due 
process. 
It may be, however, that the very nature of the decree precludes a 
review of the Probate Court's action after a substantial period of time 
has passed. In Pettee v. Wilmarth 8 the Supreme Judicial Court held 
that the Probate Court was in error when it revoked a decree for a 
widow's allowance and granted a lesser amount. The Court, while 
recognizing that the probate judge could decree an additional allow-
ance, held that the initial award gave the widow a vested right in the 
allowance decreed to her; to permit revocation would make her rights 
uncertain, as she would hold the award only at the discretion of the 
probate judge.9 
The Probate Court like the Equity Court has extensive powers to 
vacate a decree by a bill of review or petition to vacate on account of 
fraud, mistake, want of jurisdiction,IO or for new evidence which first 
became known to the party seeking relief after decree.ll It was not 
alleged that there was any fraud, mistake or want of jurisdiction in the 
Vaughan case. To permit a revocation of a decree of allowance for 
the purpose of reducing the amount of the award might be consid-
ered inconsistent with the very object of the decree.12 The purpose 
of an allowance for necessaries is connected with the exigency and 
emergency that exists when a widow is suddenly deprived of support 
and maintenance on the death of her spouse; the measure is an ex-
pedient and temporary one pending the settlement of the estate. 
Because of its emergency nature the award may be given precedence 
over debts, legacies and funeral expenses.1S It may be for these reasons, 
7 G.L., c. 215, §§9, 15. 
85 Allen 144 (Mass. 1862). 
DIbid. 
10 Reynolds v. Remick, 333 Mass. 1, 127 N.E.2d 653 (1955); Lovell v. Lovell, 276 
Mass. 10, 176 N.E. 210 (1931); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 266 Mass. 228, 165 N.E. 89 
(1929). 
11 Kennedy v. Simmons, 308 Mass. 431, 433, 32 N.E.2d 215, 216 (1941). 
12 Richardson v. Hazelton, 101 Mass. 108 (1869). 
13 Bush v. Clark, 127 Mass. III (1879); Kingsbury v. Wilmal'th, 2 Allen 310 (Man. 
1861); Williams v. Williams, 5 Gray 24 (Mass. 1855). 
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as well as the great discretion that is placed on the judge, that the 
General Court did not require any notice to be given to interested 
parties before an allowance for necessaries may be decreed.14 In the 
ordinary case the judge making the award can be relied upon to safe-
guard the interests of all parties entitled to share in the estate. 
§ 12.3. Administrator accounting for a resulting trust. If A pays 
the purchase money for land conveyed by the owner to B and if there 
is no intent to make a gift to B, B holds legal title on a resulting trust 
for A. On A's death B may be called upon to account for the property 
to the successors to A's interest. The remedy against B will be in 
equity to enforce the resulting trust. If B is also the administrator of 
the estate of A, it would appear that he could not be called upon to 
account for such land in an administrator's account because the sub-
ject matter, being realty, descends directly to the heirs, by-passing the 
personal representative. If B also gave A a protective mortgage, how-
ever, the question may be raised whether B may be called upon to 
account for the land qua administrator or at least as a trustee in a 
proceeding concerning the administrator's account. 
In Sullivan v. Sullivan 1 the father of the administrator of his estate 
in his lifetime paid the purchase price for real estate conveyed to the 
son by another. The son gave his father a protective mortgage on the 
property and after his father's death included the mortgage in a 
reduced amount in his administrator's inventory. In a hearing on the 
probate account the auditor, after finding that there was no debt to the 
intestate and that the administrator held upon a resulting trust, ruled 
that the determination of the interests of the parties in the real estate 
was not a matter to be considered in proceedings concerning the ad-
ministrator's account but must be dealt with in a wholly separate equity 
proceeding. 
The Supreme Judicial Court concluded that the auditor was in 
error, stating: 
This note, as a protective precaution, was sufficiently an asset of 
the estate, even if not representing a real debt, to serve as a basis 
for requiring [the administrator] to account for the intestate's 
interest in the real estate securing it. [The administrator] cannot 
be permitted simultaneously to contend that the amount of the 
note is not to be included in the probate account as a collected 
debt and, at the same time, fail to recognize the resulting trust in 
real estate which the note protected. In connection with this 
proceeding, as a concomitant of recognition of nonliability to 
account as administrator for the amount of the note, he must 
account for the property held upon resulting trust.2 
The Court, after observing that an accounting for the real estate was 
14 Wright v. Wright, 13 Allen 207, 210 (Mass. 1866). 
§12.3. 1335 Mass. 268, 139 N.E.2d 510 (1957). 
2335 Mass. at 272, 139 N.E.2d at 514. 
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not appropriately an integral part of the probate account, concluded 
that the administrator should be required to file in the Probate Court 
an account as trustee under the resulting trust. This account would be 
the subject of further proceedings on the probate account. All the 
interested persons were parties to the probate proceedings and this 
disposition of the issues involving the purchase money resulting trust 
would avoid circuity of action and unnecessary litigation. It was rec-
ognized that there was a departure from the formal and ordinary rules 
of accounting by a personal representative of a decedent's estate, but 
the situation was considered unusual and the result justified by 
Cook v. Howe.s 
In the Cook case the executor held title to property of the testatrix 
under a purchase money resulting trust. After testatrix' death he sold 
it and failed to account for the proceeds of its sale in his executor's 
account. It was pointed out that the accountant was both the ex-
ecutor and trustee; that the proceeding in the Probate Court is to be 
considered for all practical purposes a proceeding in equity; that the 
relations of executor and trustee had been established and created by 
the testatrix; that all the beneficiaries of the trust were before the 
court as parties to the proceedings involving the executor's account; 
and that all persons except the executor desired to treat the money 
from the sale as the trust res. It was then concluded that it was proper 
for the Probate Court to consider and determine the resulting trust 
issue, thereby avoiding circuity of action. Any decree rendered by 
the court would be res judicata. 
The Cook case would seem to be a clear-cut precedent justifying the 
result of the Sullivan case but for a statement volunteered by the 
Court in Cook that, since an executor does not obtain title to real 
estate, "if the real estate had not been sold by the accountant as 
holder of the legal title, it would have no proper place in his account."4 
The Court in Sullivan thought the distinction, based on the fact that 
the subject matter of the resulting trust may have been realty instead 
of personalty at the time of the probate accounting proceedings, would 
seem "more formal than substantive." Whether the subject matter 
be land or personal property, the personal representative would be 
called upon to account for the subject matter of the trust qua trustee 
even though the hearing may be on an estate accounting. 
On the other hand, the Sullivan case placed emphasis on the fact 
that there was a protective mortgage on the property subject to the 
trust which served as a basis for requiring the personal representative 
to account for the real estate security. Yet, in view of the general 
approach of Cook and Sullivan to the problems considered in both 
cases, it would appear to make no difference that there was a mort-
gage protecting the intestate's interest. The question should be 
whether the trust and probate issues could be effectively resolved in 
3280 Masi. 325, 182 N.E. 581 (1932). 
4280 Mau. at 328, 182 N .E. at 582. 
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the same proceeding without the possibility of any substantial dis-
advantage to the parties involved. 
§ 12.4. Counsel fees: Charging the general estate. General Laws, 
c. 215, § 39A 1 provides that an attorney who has rendered services to 
an estate, its representative or its distributees, may petition the Probate 
Court for the allowance of compensation and expenses. It states that 
"[t]he court may direct payment thereof from the estate generally 
or from funds in the hands of the representative of the estate and 
belonging to any legatee, devisee, distributee or other person interested 
therein." The general language of the statute was given a more 
precise meaning and its vagueness diminished to some extent by the 
decision in Miller v. Stern.2 The Court there refused to allow attorney's 
fees out of the general estate where the services were not rendered to 
the estate or its representative and where counsel was not successful 
in creating, preserving or increasing the estate. It refused to charge 
counsel fees to the general estate where the attorney's services bene-
fited no persons interested in the decedent's estate other than the 
attorney's clients. 
In Brayton v. Stoughton,3 the lower court denied an attorney's pe-
tition for counsel fees to be paid out of the estate on the ground that 
his efforts were of no benefit to the estate. His services were employed 
to obtain a greater share for his clients, the collateral heirs, at the 
expense of another distributee. The Supreme Judicial Court held, 
however, that the lawyer's compensation could quite properly be 
charged to the general estate. It recognized that the litigation on be-
half of the appealing heirs did not create, preserve or increase the 
estate, but thought the case was distinguishable from Miller v. Stern. 
All of the distributees except the widow-administratrix of the dece-
dent's estate stood to gain from the successful representation by the 
petitioning lawyer in the Brayton case. It was the administratrix' delay 
that led the collateral heirs to resort to litigation and she should not 
be in any position to complain of the award against the general estate. 
The Court's departure from the ordinary rule appears to be fully 
justified on the facts. A contrary holding would have diminished the 
net distributive share of the collateral heirs only because of the un-
warranted delay of the only other distributee. One of the practical 
reasons for the rule set out in Miller v. Stern is that allowance of 
counsel fees out of the general estate when the attorney does not 
represent or increase the estate would tend to promote litigation. A 
contestant and his attorney might find little to deter them from filing 
suits to press questionable claims when they are assured that expenses 
of litigation would be paid out of the general estate.4 The holding 
of Brayton does not carry with it such undesirable consequences. To 
§12.4. 1 As amended by Acts of 1951, c. BO. 
2326 Mass. 296. 93 N.E.2d B15 (1950). 
3335 Mass. 321, 140 N.E.2d 161 (1957). 
4 Miller v. Stern, 326 Mass. 296, 303-304, 93 N.E.2d B15, 819 (1950). 
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the contrary, a different result might tend to encourage lack of dili-
gence in the performance of a fiduciary duty by a personal representa-
tive who is also a beneficiary. 
A similar question arose in Vaughan v. Smith/' where an adminis-
tratrix sought the allowance of an item in her account for counsel 
fees. The principal service by the attorney related to determining 
whether the proceeds of an insurance policy payable to the widow and 
joint bank deposits passing to her on the death of her husband ren-
dered the estate liable for the Federal estate tax. The Court held 
that so much of the fee as related to the services connected with the 
estate tax problems was properly charged to the estate. Counsel was 
acting for the benefit of the widow qua administratrix because she 
would be the one liable to pay the death taxes had any become due. 
In view of the tax apportionment statute of Massachusetts 6 only the 
widow received financial benefit from the efforts of counsel. Yet, since 
the attorney was representing the widow as administratrix, who had 
to know whether she must pay any estate tax, such services are 
properly rendered to the estate and its representative. The case cannot 
be said to conflict with Miller v. Stern.7 
§12.5. Husband and wife: Purchase money resulting trust. There 
is a presumption that a gift is intended when a husband pays the pur-
chase money for a transfer of title to property to his wife.1 
In order to establish a resulting trust against his wife the hus-
band must prove (I) that he himself furnished either "the entire 
consideration or a specific and definite part thereof, for which it 
was intended he should receive a determinate and fixed fraction of 
the whole estate conveyed" and (2) that "it was not intended at 
the time of the conveyance that the wife should take a bene-
ficial interest in the property by way of gift, settlement or 
advancement." 2 
Frank v. Frank,3 decided during the 1957 SURVEY year, indicates 
that before a resulting trust will be raised in favor of a husband, he 
must prove more than an intent to take an undetermined beneficial 
interest in the property. The master found that the husband paid 
the entire consideration for the transfer of property to his wife and 
that he did not intend to make a gift, settlement, or advance to the 
5335 Mass. 418, 140 N.E.2d 195 (1957). 
6 G.L., c. 65A, §5, as amended by Acts of 1948, c. 605, §l. 
7326 Mass. 296, 93 N.E.2d 815 (1950). 
§12.5. 14 Scott, Trusts §442 (2d ed. 1956); Souza v. Souza, 325 Mass. 761, 762, 
90 N.E.2d 572, 573 (1950); Berry v. Kyes, 304 Mass. 56, 61, 22 N.E.2d 622, 626 
(1939); Moat v. Moat, 301 Mass. 469, 471, 17 N.E.2d 710, 711 (1938). 
2301 Mass. at 471,17 N.E.2d at 711. The Court quoted from Pollock v. Pollock, 
223 Mass. 382, 384, 111 N.E. 963, 964 (1916), and Daniels v. Daniels, 240 Mass. 380, 
385, 134 N.E. 235, 236 (1922). 
3335 Mass. 130, 138 N.E.2d 586 (1956). 
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defendant as her sole property and for her sole benefit.4 The findings 
indicate that he was to take some beneficial interest in the property 
but it was not clear what the extent of this interest was. The Court 
remanded the case for further hearing since the findings of the master 
did not afford an adequate basis for a decree. 
When a person furnishes part of the consideration for the purchase 
of property a resulting trust may arise in his favor for an agreed frac-
tional or fixed part of the property.1i If the entire purchase price is 
furnished, it is still possible to impress a resulting trust on less than 
all of the property if the payor manifested an intent to take a specific 
or distinct interest.6 The facts of the Frank case indicated merely that 
the plaintiff's wife was not to have the sole interest in the property 
and did not show the extent of the ownership intended for both parties. 
§ 12.6. Straw conveyance: Resulting trust. A tranfer of legal title 
to a "straw" has the effect of placing a naked record title in the 
nominee with the beneficial ownership remaining in the grantor.1 
The transferor's interest is equitable in the nature of a beneficiary's 
interest under an oral or resulting trust. This interest may not be 
enforceable against the property itself if the Statute of Frauds is 
pleaded 2 or placed in issue by a demurrer to a complaint alleging an 
oral understanding as to the true ownership.s 
The case of Barche v. Shea 4 involved a transfer of real estate by 
husband and wife to their son who was to be a straw owner pending 
disposition of a divorce proceeding brought by the husband. About 
the time the divorce became final the son was induced by his mother 
to execute a deed in her favor and later executed another one in favor 
of his father. The trial judge, after a finding that the grantors in-
tended to retain equal interests in the land, entered a decree that the 
woman grantor held a one-half undivided interest in trust for the 
other grantor. The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the decree point-
ing out that the Statute of Frauds was not pleaded and that the son 
was ready to carry out any understanding his parents might have had. 
The Court thought that the mother in effect induced the son to commit 
a breach of his fiduciary obligation by causing him to transfer title 
to her and that the record title she obtained was subject to the same 
fiduciary obligation. 
Although the father may have been blameworthy in inducing his 
son to give him a deed to the land, he was not to be denied relief 
for want of "clean hands." The Court stated: "No defence based on 
4335 Mass. at 133-134, 138 N.E.2d at 588. 
5 Dwyer v. Dwyer, 275 Mass. 490, 176 N.E. 619 (1931); Druker v. Druker, 268 
Mass. 334, 167 N.E. 638 (1929). 
6 Zambunos v. Zambunos, 324 Mass. 220, 85 N.E.2d 328 (1949). 
§12.6. 1 Collins v. Curtin, 325 Mass. 123, 125, 89 N.E.2d 211, 212 (1949). 
2 Gould v. Lynde, 114 Mass. 366 (1874); Titcomb v. Morrill, 10 Allen 15 (Mass. 
1865). 
3 Ranicar v. Goodwin, 326 Mass. 710,96 N.E.2d 853 (1950). 
4 335 Mass. 367, 140 N .E.2d 305 (1957). 
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the plaintiff's conduct has been pleaded and no harm has been caused 
to the defendant by the deed from the son to the plaintiff." Ii 
§12.7. Rule against perpetuities: Severable shares. According to 
the classic statement of the rule against perpetuities, "[n]o interest is 
good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after 
some life in being at the creation of the interest." 1 If there is a gift 
to a class, the interest of each and every member of the class must 
vest within the period of the rule or the entire gift fails. 2 The court 
when applying the rule will not sever the interests of class members 
and treat each member's interest separately unless the grantor ex-
pressly made the gift a severable one. If the grantor splits a class 
gift into various subclasses, then each subclass will be considered 
separately. Invalidating one share or subclass under the rule does not 
affect the validity of others.3 
Thus if A settles property on an irrevocable trust to pay the income 
to A for life and on A's death to pay the income to A's issue from 
time to time living until the death of the last surviving child of A, 
at which time the trust is to terminate and the principal divided 
among A's issue then living, the gift of corpus is void and the gift of 
income to the issue would also faiJ.4 It would make no difference that 
issue of the settlor were living at the date of the creation of the trust 
and that the same issue survived its termination. Since the trust is 
irrevocable, the period of the rule commences to run from its creation. 
A child of the settlor might be born after the date of the trust settle-
ment and such child might be the one who answers the description 
of last survivor of the trustor's children. The gifts after the life estate 
to the settlor fail because, being gifts to a class, the shares and mem-
bership might fluctuate for longer than twenty-one years after any 
life in being. There is no severance of the gift into separate shares. 
The 1957 SURVEY year produced an interesting case involving the 
application of the doctrine of severable shares to save future interests 
created in favor of issue of the creator of an inter vivos trust. In 
Second Bank-State Street Trust Co. v. Second Bank-State Street Trust 
Co./) the settlor of an irrevocable trust gave himself income for life 
and on his death to his wife for life. The trust instrument went on to 
provide in part: 
"After the decease of both the" settlor and "[his wife] the said 
-,-
trust estate shall be held in trust for the benefit of the children 
5335 Mass. at 371, 140 N.E.2d at 308. 
§12.7. 1 Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 201 (4th ed., Roland Gray, 
1942). 
2 Leake v. Robinson, 2 Mer. 363. 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817). 
3 See Smith's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 140 F.2d 759 (lid 
Cir. 1944). 
4 Ryan v. Ward. 192 Md. 342. 64 A.2d 258. 7 A.L.R.2d 1078 (1949); Bundy v. 
United States Trust Co. of New York. 257 Mass. 72, 153 N.E. 337 (1926). 
1\ 335 Mass. 407. 140 N.E.2d 201 (1957). 
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of the said [settlor], and the issue of any child who may have 
deceased, each child to receive an equal share of the net income 
therefrom during his or her life. The share of any child who shall 
die leaving no issue surviving him or her shall be held in trust 
for the equal benefit of the surviving children of the said 
[settlor], and the issue of any deceased child, taking by the stocks; 
and the net income therefrom shall be paid over equally to such 
surviving children during their lives, and to the issue of any 
deceased child, such issue taking their parents' share. If any child 
of the said [settlor] shall die leaving issue, his or her share shall 
be held in trust for the benefit of such issue, and the net income 
therefrom paid over to such issue, per stirpes ... until the termina-
tion of this trust. At the expiration of twenty-one years after 
the death of the last survivor of the children of the said [settlor], 
this trust shall terminate, and the trust estate sball then be 
distributed among such issue, per stirpes, and not per capita; and 
until the termination of this trust, the trust estate shall be held 
together, and administered as one trust." 6 
The settlor had five children none of whom was born after the creation 
of the trust. One son predeceased the trustor leaving two children 
who were born after the transfer in trust. 
The Court concluded that there was no violation of the rule against 
perpetuities. Even after having assumed that after-born children were 
intended to benefit under the trust, it found that all interests were to 
vest within the period of the rule. The settlor created separate shares 
the size of which would become fixed not later than the time of the 
death of the settlor. Each share was to be considered separately in 
applying the rule and all of his children who were the life beneficiaries 
under the trust would be considered lives in being with respect to 
the trusts involving the specific shares in which each of them were 
income beneficiaries. 
The most ann~roblem that had to be faced was whether the 
ultimate gifi"OV~r of the corpus to the issue was subject to fluctuation 
in membership and size. It was held, however, that the gift of the 
corpus was to issue per stirpes of ascertained shares and the particular 
shares had to vest at the death of each child of the settlor. If the gift 
were to issue per capita, there would have been one class and a 
probable violation of the rule. But, here, considering each share as 
a separate gift, the issue obtained vested interests on the death of 
their parents. The Court did not consider it necessary to follow a 
rule of construction that a limitation to issue meant those surviving 
the time set for distribution.7 It found a dispositive pattern in the 
trust instrument to provide for vested interests in the issue on the 
death of each child of the settlor. Moreover, it was felt that if the 
6335 Mass. at 408·409, 140 N.E.2d at 204. 
T See !I Restatement of Property §§249, 292, 296. 
r 
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trust provisions were subject to two reasonable interpretations, one of 
which would save the gifts under the rule, that construction which 
would validate the limitation should be preferred. 
Although it appears that the "second look" doctrine adopted by the 
recent perpetuities statute in Massachusetts 8 would have preserved all 
gifts even though the trust were considered to benefit one general 
class, the statute was unapplicable since the trust was created in 1930.9 
It was necessary, therefore, to find severable shares to validate all 
gifts.10 
§12.8. Die without issue: Fee tail. The phrase "die without issue" 
appearing in dispositive provisions of wills is pregnant with ambiguity. 
If a testator makes a gift to B and if B die without issue then to C, 
the question may arise as to the time.:wh.en.·~B's line of issue must rWL 
Q,:!!._ before C can take. One....inteIpIe..ta.ilim .. would be that 3...J!.!1.P-
stitutionaI gift was mteDded, c.,to take only on condition that neither B 
nOl']:3's iss.ue.. . .be-.living.at.Jh~4~te. . .QL~~~~'l..t.<?(s death. Another con-
struction gives B the bequest subject to an executing limitation in 
favor of C, C to enjoy the property only if B dies without leaving issue 
surviving him .• H~re . "die without issue" is given the meaning of 
definite failure of issue and appears to be the modern rule of con-
struction.1 This preference for a definite failure of issue interpreta-
tion has become a part of Massachusetts law if the instrument in 
question was executed after April 30, 1888.2 
The third approach would give the phrase an indefinite failure of 
issue meaning: If the subject matter were land a fee tail estate would 
be created in B and a vested remainder in C; if it were a bequest 
or a legacy, B would take absolutely, C's interest being void under the 
rule against perpetuities. This was the older and orthodox common 
law approach confirmed by many Massachusetts cases involving deeds 
and wills executed before 1888.8 
An intervening life estate preceding the gifts to Band C would add 
further ambiguity to the limitation. Assume a devise to A for life, 
remainder to B, but if B die without issue then to C. In addition to 
the three possible constructions previously mentioned there may be 
added the interpretation that a substitutional devise was intended 
8 G.L., c. 184A. inserted by Acts of 1954. c. 641. 
9 General Laws. c. 184A, applies to inter vivos instruments taking effect after 
January 1. 1955. 
10 Compare Sears v. Coolidge. 329 Mass. 340, 108 N.E.2d 563 (1952) ; see Merchants 
National Bank v. Curtis. 98 N.H. 225. 97 A.2d 207 (1953). 
§12.8. 13 Restatement of Property §266. On this topic generally. see 5 Ameri-
can Law of Property §§2I.49-21.53 (Casner ed. 1952); 1 Simes and Smith, Future 
Interests §§521-539 (2d ed. 1956). 
2 G.L., c. 184. §6. 
8 Gilkie v. Marsh. 186 Mass. 336, 337-339, 71 N.E. 703, 703-704 (1904); Allen v. 
Trustees of Ashley School Fund. 102 Mass. 262. 264 (1869); Hatl"l: Priest, 6 Gray 
18. 20-21 (Mass. 1856); Terry v. Briggs. 12 Metc. 17. 22-23 (Mass. 1846); Nightin-
gale v. Burrell, 15 Pick. 104. 109-115 (Mass. 1833). 
" 
;t 
\ 
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with the time of A's death being the critical date. Under this view, 
if B survived the life tenant, B would take absolutely to the exclusion 
of C, C taking only on condition that B die without leaving issue 
surviving A. This would seem to be the present-day approach and the 
one most consonant with the desires of the alL~[~ge testator who prob-
ably woWcl--pRl£er a-COlllp!ete a!l..Q....1in.al distrjbntioll gf tbe property 
on..the. . .dea.th-o£-tbe..li£e...wnant.4 Whether the older law would adopt 
an indefinite failure of issue construction of such a limitation was up 
for consideration by the Supreme Judicial Court in 1957. 
In Hayes v. Hammond 5 the testator died in the 1850's giving his 
wife a life estate. His will went on to provide: 
"After the decease of my said wife ... my Estate ... shall descend 
in four equal parts: to wit one part to my daughters [naming 
three daughters] .. , and the other part to [a granddaughter] ... : 
To hold the same to them, their respective heirs, administrators 
and assigns forever: But if either of my said daughters or grand-
daughter should die without issue, then in such case my will is 
that such respective part or parts should descend in equal propor-
tions to said surviving legatees or to their legal representatives." 6 
The Court, after a suggestion that the result would have been differ-
ent had the will been recently executed, held that the daughters and 
granddaughter received a fee tail estate in the realty passing under 
the will. 
Massachusetts cases decided under the law effective before the 1888 
statute uniformly took the position that "die without issue" meant 
indefinite failure of issue.7 Although this was a rule of construction 
it was apparently so well established that some of the cases went so 
far as to loosely call the rule one of law.8 The Court thought that 
there was nothing in the will that would give "die without issue" 
other than its technical meaning prevalent at the time of the execution 
of the will. It was not considered significant that there was a prior 
life estate and that in aU likelihood the testator's estate consisted of 
both personalty and realty. 
§12.9. Vesting of-gifts of future interests to heirs. In Boston Safe 
Deposit and Trust Co. v. Northey 1 the testator left surplus income 
during the life of the principal income beneficiary to his three brothers 
"and in case of the death of any of said brothers his share of said income 
to be paid to his heirs." Upon the death of the principal income bene-
ficiary the trust was to terminate and the fund distributed "equally 
4 3 Restatement of Property §269; 5 American Law of Property §21.53 (Casner 
ed.1952). 
51957 Mass. Adv. Sh. 881, 143 N.E.2d 693. 
61957 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 882, 143 N.E.2d at 695. 
7 See the cases cited in note 3 supra. 
8 Gilkie v. Marsh, 186 Mass. 336, 338, 71 N.E. 703, 704 (1904); Brown v. Addison 
Gilbert Hospital, 155 Mass. 323, 326, 29 N.E. 625, 626 (1892). 
§12.9. 1335 Mass. 201, HI8 N.E.2d 613 (1956). 
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between my three brothers and their heirs, the heirs of any to take by 
right of representation." It was previously held that on the death of 
a brother before the termination of the trust, his share of income was 
to pass to his wife who was his sole heir.2 
The present case decided that those persons who answered the 
description of heirs of the two brothers who predeceased the testator 
as of the time of the testator's death received vested interests in the 
surplus income and in the principal. The death of any of these 
heirs before the death of the principal income beneficiary caused 
their respective shares of income and corpus to go to their estates. As 
to the share of the brother who survived the testator but died before 
the termination of the trust, it went to the person who was his heir 
at the date of his death. His widow was his sole heir and took a one-
third indefeasible share of income and principal. 
Since the will did not express the desires of the testator on the 
mode of devolution of the trust fund on the contingencies the Court 
had to consider, it was necessary to rely on rules on construction. The 
usual rule is that a gift to the "heirs" of a named person means those 
determined to be his heirs as of the date of his death.3 If the named 
ancestor dies before the testator, then those who answer the descrip-
tion of heirs of the ancestor as of the date of testator's death take.4 
This construction is in line with the general policy favoring the early 
vesting of future interests. The Court refused to imply a condition 
of survivorship from the fact of postponement of enjoyment, since, 
nothing in the will tended to rebut the ordinary rules of construction. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§12.10. Uniform Gifts to Minors Act.1 Although the law has 
always recognized that there may be valid gifts made to minors, the 
many legal and practical difficulties that attend such gifts have tended 
to discourage them. A minor's inexperience, his possible lack of 
physical and mental capacity, as well as the disabilities and protection 
2 Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Northey, 332 Mass. II 0, 123 N.E.2d 365 
(1954), noted in 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §2.l4. 
33 Restatement of Property §308; Sweeney v. Kennard, 331 Mass. 542, 544-546. 
120 N.E.2d 910, 912-913 (1954). 
43 Restatement of Property § 309; Swallow v. Swallow, 166 Mass. 241, 243, 44 
N.!:. 132, 133 (1896). 
§12.l0. 1 Space limitations preclude the discussion of the various consequences 
following the creation of a custodianship under the act, such as tax and conflict of 
laws problems and the circumstances under which the creation of the arrangement 
would be advisable. The following articles may be read for a more comprehensive 
treatment of the subject matter of this section: Quiggle, Gifts of Securities to 
Minors Acts-Tax Aspects, 43 A.B.A.]. 264 (1957); Widmark, Security Gifts to 
Minors, 95 Trusts & Estates 698 (1956); MacNeill, Giving to Minors Made Easy-
In Eight States, 35 Trust Bull. No.3, p. 28 (1955); Moore, Uniform Gifts of Securi-
ties to Minors Act: A Consideration of Its Merits, 33 U. Detroit L.J. 298 (1956); 
Note, Recent Legislation to Facilitate Gifts of Securities to Minors, 69 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1476 (1956). 
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that the law imposes upon him, make his management of property 
transferred to him a vexing problem. 
Apart from such assets as United States Savings Bonds 2 and bank 
accounts,3 title held by a minor is to a large extent frozen. His right 
to disaffirm any transaction makes it extremely undesirable for others 
to deal with him; stock brokers and transfer agents are especially 
wary. However, it is always possible to have a guardian appointed to 
manage and administer the property. But burdens, rigidity and ex-
pense are involved. Court proceedings are necessary, a bond must be 
filed by the guardian, annual accountings must be made, investments 
are somewhat restricted and there is a general lack of flexibility. It 
would seem that a better managerial relationship could be created 
by establishing a trust for the benefit of the minor. The trust may be 
made as flexible as desirable; powers of investment and administration 
may be broadened; the method of accounting may be simplified; and 
court-appointed guardians may be avoided. Yet, as in the case of the 
guardianship, there are legal and management fees and expenses in-
volved which may deter the creation of the relationship, especially 
if the subject matter of the trust is a small amount of money or 
property. 
In order to encourage small gifts to minors by providing for a 
simple and inexpensive method of giving cash and securities to them, 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
prepared the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act.4 It was enacted with 
some minor changes in Massachusetts in 1957 as G.L., c. 201A.1\ 
The act provides that any adult person may make a gift of a security 
to a minor in one of two ways. If the security is in registered form, 
it will be registered "in the name of the donor, another adult person 
or a trust company, followed, in substance, by the words: - 'as cus-
todian for [name of minor] under the Massachusetts Uniform Gifts 
to Minors Act:" 6 If the security is in bearer form, delivery of it 
must be made to any adult person other than the donor or to a trust 
company and it must be accompanied by a statement of gift, the form 
of which is prescribed.7 If money is the subject matter, it may be 
given "by paying or delivering it to a broker or a bank for credit to 
an account in the name of the donor, another adult person or a trust 
company, followed, in substance, by the words: - 'as custodian for 
231 C.F.R. §306.50, §315.4(b)(2); 1954 Supp., §315.39. Bonds may be redeemed 
by the parent or the minor. 
3 The account may be in the name of the depositor "in trust" for the minor. A 
minor usually can withdraw deposits and make out checks. 
4 The act was passed in 29 states in 1957. An earlier model act, known as the 
Gifts of Securities to Minors Act and sponsored by the New York Stock Exchange 
and the Association of Stock Exchange Firms, had been enacted in 11 states, Alaska 
and the District of Columbia in 1955 and 1956. 
1\ Acts of 1957, c. 724. 
6 Id. §2 (1). 
7 Id. §2 (2). 
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[name of minor] under the Massachusetts Uniform Gifts to Minors 
Act.''' 8 
A gift pursuant to the statute becomes irrevocable 9 and the cus-
todian's powers, duties and liabilities are recited in detail. The 
custodian in effect becomes a trustee. He is required to manage and 
invest the property and is given discretion to apply so much of the 
property as he may deem advisable for the support, maintenance, 
education and benefit of the minor "with or without court order, 
with or without regard to the duty of himself or of any other person 
to support the minor or his ability to do so, and with or without 
regard to any other income or property of the minor which may 
be applicable or available for any such purpose." 10 He may be re-
quired by the court to apply so much of the custodial property as is 
necessary for the support, maintenance or education of the minor.H 
Whatever property is left must be paid over to the minor on his reach-
ing the age of twenty-one or to his estate if he dies before that 
time.12 
The custodian has the absolute discretion to retain any securities, 
and if he makes any investments he must act according to the require-
ments of the prudent man rule of Massachusetts.Is He is also given 
many of the administrative powers that a well-drafted trust instrument 
gives a trustee for the efficient administration of a trust: the powers 
to sell, to vote securities by proxy, to join in the reorganization of any 
corporation whose securities are held by him and to consent to its 
consolidation, merger, dissolution or liquidation, and to execute in-
struments deemed advisable for proper administration of the prop-
erty.14 In addition to the rights and powers specifically provided for 
in the act, the custodian has all the rights and powers which a 
guardian has with respect to property not held as custodial property.I5 
The custodian is required to keep accounts and exhibit them an-
nually to the minor if he is over the age of fourteen years or, if the 
minor is under that age, then to a parent of the minor if different 
from the custodian himself and, if not, then to the legally appointed 
guardian or to an adult member of the minor's family.I6 The final 
account must be delivered to the minor within six months after he 
has reached the age of twenty-one years. If the custodianship is 
terminated earlier, then the final account is to be delivered to the 
8 Id. §2 (3). 
9 Id. §3. 
10 Id. §4 (b). 
11 Id. §4 (c). 
12 Id. §4 (d). 
13 Id. §4 (e); see Harvard College v. Amory, 9 Pick. 446, 461 (Mass. 1830). 
14 Acts of 1957, c. 724, §4 (f). 
15 Id. §4 (i). 
16 Acts of 1957, c. 724, §l(h) defines a member of a minor's family as "any parent, 
grandparent, brother, sister, uncle or aunt of the minor, whether of the whole 
blood or the half blood, or by or through legal adoption." 
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minor's legal representative 17 within six months of the termination.18 
There is a right to petition the Probate Court for an accounting but 
the right terminates two years after the minor reaches the age of 
twenty-one or dies and the custodian has delivered his final account 
to the minor or his legal representative.19 
The act provides for reimbursement of the custodian for his reason-
able expenses 20 and that the custodian may act without compensa-
tion.21 Standards for compensation for custodians who are not donors 
are set out.22 A custodian need not give a bond, unless required to 
do so by the Probate Court for cause shown in a petition.23 
If a custodian does not receive compensation for his services he 
"shall not be liable for losses to the custodial property unless they 
result from his bad faith, intentional wrongdoing or gross negligence 
or from his failure to maintain the standard of prudence in investing 
the custodial property provided in this chapter." 24 
Resignation, removal and appointment of successor custodians are 
the subjects of many detailed provisions in the act.25 The dealings of 
stockbrokers, transfer agents, corporations and banks with donors and 
custodians are simplified with little, if any, risk of liability that 
ordinarily is present when one transacts business with a known 
fiduciary.26 
The statute specifically provides that it "shall not be construed as 
providing an exclusive method for making gifts to minors." 27 
17 Acts of 1957. c. 724. §l(g) defines "legal representative" as "an executor, 
administrator. guardian or conservator." 
18 Id. §4 (h). 
10 Id. §8 (a). 
20 Id. §5 (a). 
21 Id. §5 (b). 
22 Id. §5 (c). 
23 Id. §§5 (d). 7 (e). 
24 Id. §5 (e). 
25Id. §7. 
28Id. §6. 
27Id. §9 (b). 
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